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Abstract
Application performance in a smart space is aﬀected by faulty behaviours of nodes and communication networks. Detection of
faults helps diagnosis of problems and maintenance can be done to restore performance, for example, by replacing or reconﬁguring
faulty parts. Fault detection methods in the literature are too complex for typical low-resource devices and they do not perform well
in detecting intermittent faults. We propose a fully distributed fault detection method that relies on evaluating statements about
trustworthiness of aggregated data from neighbors. Given one or more trust statements that describe a fault-free state, the trustor
node determines for each observation coming from the trustee whether it is an outlier or not. Several fault types can be explored
using diﬀerent trust statements whose parameters are assessed diﬀerently. The trustor subsequently captures the observation history
of the trustee node in only two evidence variables using evidence update rules that give more weight to recent observations. The
proposed method detects not only permanent faults but also intermittent faults with high accuracy and low false alarm rate.
c© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs.
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1. Introduction
In smart spaces, smart objects such as sensor nodes and smart phones are connected over a network in order to
enable human-centric applications. By their very nature, smart spaces and smart objects therein are hampered by
faulty behaviours of smart objects and communication networks interconnecting these. Furthermore, increment in
number of devices also leads to higher failure probability. As this is a danger for the performance and even the
correctness of smart space applications, faults must be detected and dealt with, preferably in an autonomous way.
Dealing with faults in practice is often through physically replacing, rebooting and reconﬁguring faulty parts by itself.
If inevitable faults lead to (temporary) erroneous behaviors, a smart space and smart space applications must be able
to quickly adapt and return back to a correct operation state without the constant need for human intervention. Fault
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detection accuracy and precision are of huge importance as false alarms and false negatives come with a price, in the
form of unecessary adaptations or failures. The focus of this paper is distributed fault detection. Adaptation is beyond
the scope of this paper and is left as future work.
Faulty behavior is observed in the form of observations that highly deviate from the average, from here on called
outliers and does not always take its source in a hardware or software fault. Short-term sequences of outliers can also
be a result of ﬂuctuations in the physical environmental conditions. Some examples are wireless signal strength loss
due to people passing by, a packet loss due to temporary radio interference and corrupted data in magnetic storage
due to cosmic rays. Some smart applications may tolerate short-term outliers without experiencing an application
failure or a signiﬁcant performance drop, while others may not. Obviously, what is ‘short-term’must be deﬁned per
application. Making a good distinction between outliers that are mostly harmless, and faults that may lead to failures
is crucial7. For this purpose, a typical approach in the literature is doing time series analysis of observations. This
becomes especially challenging in distributed smart space architectures where most of the computation and decision
making are done locally, without the computational resources and the global overview of a central server. This is
because each smart object observes the environment from its own limited point of view.
Ideally, communication, memory and computation overheads of fault detection should be negligible and allow scal-
ing to large networks9. A distributed fault detection method based on trust management is suitable for this purpose
as the entire history of observations (information that is relevant) is captured in a single trust variable. A trust rela-
tionship between neighbors provides a local view of the network. There are two entities in such a trust relationship: a
trustor and a trustee. The trustor relies on the trustee for the truth of a predicate. Bui et al. 4 states that such a predicate
can be, for example, on the integrity, the security or the correctness of the data of the trustee. It can also be on the
correct functioning of the trustee or the communication network in between. In the proposed method, the trustor tries
to identify whether statements regarding the trustee given by predicates are trustworthy or not. Trust opinions are
derived from subjective logic that represents speciﬁc belief calculus and considers uncertainty as given by Josang et
al. 6.
Sensor nodes send their statistics to neighbor nodes and a base station. The trust is derived from the packet
transmissions between sensor nodes. The trustee sends packets that consist of measurements such as communication
statistics and sensor readings. Our fault model aims to identify sensor faults and communication faults which might
be permanent or intermittent. A permanent fault means that the sensor node generates outliers continuously for the
remainder of its lifetime. The source of intermittent faults is typically faulty hardware or faulty software. In this
case the faulty component gives a series of outliers at irregular inter-arrival times8. Observations of smart objects are
monitored for capturing the history of outliers, which may overall indicate a fault.
This paper presents a distributed method that detects both permanent faults and intermittent faults based on trust
management. In comparison to approaches that employ time series analysis on a recent time-window1,2,14, the pro-
posed method has much lower memory footprint. It works with very little communication overhead as the only
addition to network traﬃc is the exchange of a couple of variables between neighbor nodes. The entire history of
observations is captured by using only two evidence variables, while giving more weight to the recent observations.
Nevertheless, the proposed method diﬀerentiates outliers and faults with very high accuracy and high precision (or
equivalently, low false alarm rate). In simple terms, after establishing which observations are outliers and which are
not as we explain later, it works in the following way. Every normal observation builds up trust that there is no fault.
Every outlier takes away trust, possibly at a diﬀerent rate. We say that there is a fault if the trust value, whose initial
value can be taken suitably depending on the application, falls below a certain threshold. This actually translates
to ‘there is not enough trust in the trust statement that describes the fault-free state’. Even if the trust value drops
dramatically due to temporary outliers, trust can be re-established after observing a number of normal observations.
On the other hand, permanent and intermittent faults give rise to a trend in which the dropping rate of trust due to
outliers is on average faster than the trust reestablishment rate, resulting in a permanent distrust. Our proposed model
investigates outliers in detail. Therefore, the proposed model could cause longer detection time in order to perform
low false alarm rate. Mahapatro et al. stated that the number of tests and frequency of tests should be deﬁned initially
for detection of intermittent faults10. The proposed method tracks the history without the requirement of repetitive
tests and parameters for the tests. Parameters of trust management only depend on the failure speciﬁcation of the
application. For example, ﬂipping a bit in the payload of one packet out of every hundred packets is not a very sig-
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niﬁcant problem for a video streaming application, while the same amount of bit ﬂips (actually ﬂipping even a single
bit) would render a downloaded executable ﬁle unusable.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related work on trust management and distributed fault
detection. In Section 3, the trust management framework is presented. Section 4 describes the fault model and a case
study. Section 5 provides the evaluation results. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2. Related Work
For distributed fault detection, Ding et al. proposed a method where each sensor node compares its own mea-
surement with the median of measurements to identify whether it is faulty11. Voting among sensor nodes is a very
well-known method for distributed fault detection. Two thresholds for spatial and temporal correlation are introduced
and modiﬁed majority voting is employed for distributed fault detection by Chen et al12. In another work13, if mea-
surements of a sensor node deviate signiﬁcantly from the weighted average, the sensor node is assumed faulty. The
weighted average of the neighbors’ measurements is calculated by considering the conﬁdence levels of the neighbors.
Transient faults are detected by employing both spatial correlation (neighbor sensor nodes) and temporal correlation
(over a time window)14. In this method, the length of the time window has to be kept very small for reducing the
computational complexity to an acceptable level. Li et al. proposed an algorithm that deviates from measurement
testing and fault detection15. In the algorithm, a local test is conducted to determine whether outliers are present.
Coordination in the clustered wireless sensor networks is employed for hierarchical trust calculation, where each
sensor node calculates trust values for all its neighbors and then cluster heads aggregate trust values of each sensor
node making a cluster overview1,2. Sun et al. 3 extend the trust model of Josang et al. 6 for fault-tolerant data aggre-
gation by making use of both spatial and temporal correlation. It is also possible to go in the other direction and
derive trust using fault detection and fault statistics. Xiao et al. stated that correlation between sensor readings can
be analyzed for self-diagnosis in a distributed manner, which is then used to calculate trust5. If sensor node detects
unusual data among its measurements, it enters to neighbor-diagnosis phase in order to determine its trustworthiness.
3. Proposed Method
We adopt the main stages of the trust management framework that is proposed by Bui et al. 4 and design each stage
of the framework for fault detection. The framework describes the main stages of making a decision based on simple
measurements. As shown in Fig. 2, it has ﬁve main stages: observation, evidence, opinion, trust value and decision.
Observations about measurements are used as input to predeﬁned evidence update rules, which lead to an opinion
about the trust statement. A trust value is extracted from this, which in turn is used to make a decision. These stages
are instantiated and clariﬁed by the fault detection method that we propose in the rest of this section.
Fig. 1: Trust Management Framework
Decision, referring to a decision on fault detection in this work, is obtained based on trust. A trust statement4 is
given by P(B, p, c, T), which means that the trustee B satisﬁes p in a given context c for a time interval T . An opinion,
wAP, represents the belief, the disbelief and the uncertainity of a trustor A about the trust statement P.
3.1. Observation about Trust Statement
An observation is derived from the functions s(·) and f (·) that operate on mi,t denoting the measurement of a sensor
node i at round t. In order to eliminate threshold dependency in computing s(mi,t) and f(mi,t), we use the modiﬁed
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Thompson Tau statistical test for deciding whether a measurement is an outlier or not. Each sensor node collects
measurements of its neighbors at each round. If the measurement of a sensor node highly deviates from the other
measurements, the observation is identiﬁed as an outlier. Hence, spatially correlated sensor nodes are expected to
observe similar measurements. In the modiﬁed Thompson Tau test, the set whose elements are the measurements of
neighbors is analyzed. mt and S t are mean and standard deviation of this set at round t. The deviation of an individual
data point, δi,t, is calculated as follows:
δi,t = |mi,t − mt | (1)
The modiﬁed Thompson Tau test assumes that the measurements are normally distributed. In (2), tα/2 is the critical
value of student’s t distribution and n is the number of elements in the set (equivalently the number of neighbors). α
is set as 0.05.
τ =
tα/2
n(n − 2 + t2
α/2)
(2)
In the proposed method, s(mi,t) and f(mi,t) are given by
s(mi,t) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0 (outlier), δi,t > τS t
1 (normal), δi,t ≤ τS t ; f (mi,t) = 1 − s(mi,t) (3)
3.2. Evidence about a Trust Statement
As shown in Fig. 1, second aspect in the framework is the evidence whose update rules are deﬁned for captur-
ing observation history. Exponential Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) for computing the evidence has memory
footprint that is considerably lower than time-window based approaches1,2,14. The evidence is represented by two
variables; se and fe. The variable se is increased upon every normal observation (s(mi,t) = 1), whereas fe is increased
with every outlier ( f (mi,t) = 1). Note that those measurements, which fall into a critical value range and cannot be
categorized as either normal or outlier add to uncertainity. These measurements translate into unknown observations
that eﬀectively weaken the evidence about the trust statement (both sei,t and f ei,t). In EWMA, weights are assigned
to observations such that an observation’s contribution to the average decreases exponentially as it gets older. This
gives higher weight to recent observations, while still taking into account the contributions of older observations. The
smoothing factors α and β are the weights for the most recent normal observation and for the most recent outlier,
respectively. Upon an unknown observation, sei,t and f ei,t are both scaled by γ. The formulas describing the evidence
update rules are given in (4).
Upon normal : sei,t ← α · s(mi,t) + (1 − α) · sei,(t−1) = α + (1 − α) · sei,(t−1)
f ei,t ← α · f (mi,t) + (1 − α) · f ei,(t−1) = (1 − α) · f ei,(t−1)
Upon outlier : sei,t ← β · s(mi,t) + (1 − β) · sei,(t−1) = (1 − β) · sei,(t−1)
f ei,t ← β · f (mi,t) + (1 − β) · f ei,(t−1) = β + (1 − β) · f ei,(t−1)
Outcome unknown : sei,t ← γ · sei,(t−1) and f ei,t ← γ · f ei,(t−1)
(4)
Note that the value of α determines the time required for trust (re-)establishment and is especially critical in the
case of intermittent faults. If a long duration of trust establishment is desirable, the weight of the recent observation
should be low, i.e. α should be close to 0. β determines the tolerance of the system to outliers. If only one outlier
indicates a fault in the system, β is initially assigned close to 1. Otherwise, β is set to a lower value, meaning that a
number of outliers back to back are required before detecting a fault.
3.3. Opinion about Trust Statement and Trust Value
The opinion wAP is given by a quadruple (b, d, u, a). The input variables to this function b (belief), d (disbelief) and u
(uncertainity) are obtained from evidences, seB,t and f eB,t of trustee B. The formulas for opinion extraction, calculation
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of trust value (tv(w)) and conﬁdence (c(w)) derived from this opinion are given by (5). Conﬁdence represents how
certain the trustor about the trust value.
b =
seB,t
seB,t + f eB,t + 
, d =
f eB,t
seB,t + f eB,t + 
, u =

seB,t + f eB,t + 
tv(w) = b + u · a , c(w) = 1 − u
(5)
Here,  is a static initialization parameter in subjective logic that i) gives u = 1 (maximum uncertainity) initially
and ii) ensures the equality b + d + u = 1 always holds, i.e. no division for tv(w) by zero when there is no evidence
yet. The weight factor a (base rate) determines the trust taken from uncertainity. In the proposed method, each trust
statement describing a fault-free state is associated with a pre-deﬁned threshold based on the fault speciﬁcation of the
system. If the trust value is below the threshold (0 ≤ tv(w) ≤ 1), a fault is detected by the trustor.
4. Case Study
4.1. Fault Model and Fault Types
A fault can be permanent or intermittent. Permanent faults are trivial to detect in the long run, although achieving
a reasonable speed of detection while not introducing false positives is still a challenge for the fault detection method.
Intermittent faults are more diﬃcult to deal with, where the outliers resulting from the fault are observed in repetitive
but not necessarily periodic bursts that are separated by random numbers of normal observations. Methods based on
the time-window approach in the literature struggle especially for two reasons; i) determining a good window size
is diﬃcult, and ii) computational complexity and memory requirements become very high for large time windows.
Consider the situation that sensor nodes follow duty cycling and send a data packet to their neighbors at each round.
A sensor node may generate errors in sensor readings or die (sensor fault). A sensor node may also struggle to
communicate (communication fault). At each round, two types of measurements are made for the fault detection:
sensor readings and packet reception.
4.2. Trust Statements and Expected Trust Curves
Based on the considered fault, that includes intermittent and permanent faults in Fig. 2, three trust statements P1,
P2 and P3 are deﬁned regarding the trustor wireless sensor node S1 and the trustee wireless sensor node S2. P1, P2
and P3 collectively describe the fault-free state as given in Table 1.
Table 1: Trust Statements in Case Study
Predicate Measurement Observation
P1 P1.p=‘S1 receives one packet from S2 at each round’ Packet reception Whether the packet is received by the trustor
P2 P2.p=‘S2 is alive’ Packet reception Whether the packet is received by the trustor
P3 P3.p=‘The measurements of S2 are accurate’ Sensor measurements Whether the measurement is an outlier
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 2: The operation (a) with point outliers, (b) with a burst of outliers, (c) with intermittent bursts of outliers, (d) permanent fault. Note that in
general (a), (b) and (c) may or may not indicate a fault depending on the fault speciﬁcation of the system and the corresponding trust parameters α,
β and γ. In this speciﬁc case study γ does not have any eﬀect as there are no unknown observations.
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Note that there is no universal trust establishment scheme for all trust statements. Logical trust establishment
strategies have to be chosen. For example, if S1 receives only one packet from S2, this implies S2 is alive and
it is logical that the trust of S1 in P2 is fully re-established instantenously. Establishing trust in P1, on the other
hand, should require time because receiving only one packet (a single normal observation) does not imply receiving
a packet consistently at each round. With the same reasoning, the trust in P3 should be established gradually as a
single accurate measurement does not necessarily imply an accurate sensor. However, the strategy for degrading trust
upon outliers for P1 and P3 should be diﬀerent. This is because we assume that packet loss is common in a decent
wireless network while inaccurate measurements (outliers) are not very common for a decent sensor. Thus, losing the
ﬁrst packet after a long sequence of good packet receptions can be due to an environmental factor such as a human
passing by the sensor. An inaccurate measurement, on the other hand, is typically a sign of hardware problems. In
general, the trust value should decrease and increase depending on the tolerance of the system to outliers and the trust
taken from normal observations, respectively. The strategies that we consider logical for trust value adjustment for
P1, P2 and P3 are shown in Fig. 3. The trustor assumes that the trustee is not faulty and trust value is initially set to 1.
Alternatively, it could also set to 0.5 for representing a neutral view of the trustee node.
(a) P1 (b) P2 (c) P3
Fig. 3: Expected trust values for P1, P2 and P3
In P1 and P2, modiﬁed Thompson Tau test to identify outliers is not necessary due to binary measurements.
Unknown observations are not considered in this use case. As a result, the sum of belief and disbelief is 1 at each
round. Therefore, trust value is equal to sei,t in this case study. The minimum number of outliers that indicates a faulty
state determines the value of β and is easily computed for permanent faults. In our previous work7, we proposed a
method for determining outlier patterns that imply a permanent fault. If n and Tthr are the minimum number of
outliers, that determines the boundary of normal state, and the trust value threshold respectively. If n number of
outliers is observed, it is considered as an indicator of a fault in the smart space application. β is given by
(1 − β)n = Tthr → β = 1 − n
√
Tthr (6)
5. Evaluation Results
Firstly, ﬂuctuations of the trust value against intermittent faults are tested. We consider four temperature sensors
that are neighbors of each other. One of the neighbors generates faulty temperature readings intermittently. In Fig. 4,
the data generated by the faulty sensor node and the trustee from the perspective of three neighbors are shown by
corresponding trust curves that are regarding trust statement, P3. The range of normal temperature readings is between
23◦C and 28◦C. On the other hand, the values of outlier data vary from 2◦C to 12◦C. The faulty sensor node generates
outliers due to intermittent fault and point outliers at the same time as seen in data points. The other neighbors generate
only point outliers. At each round whose duration is 1s, each neighbor identiﬁes outliers generated by its neighbors
using the modiﬁed Thompson Tau test. In Fig. 4, trust value ﬂuctuations of the trustee node against an intermittent
faults are shown. The initial trust value is set to 0.5, representing a neutral view. A faulty sensor node generates a burst
intermittent faults and point outliers. After the ﬁrst intermittent burst of outliers (due to fault), the trust values drop
dramatically for all trustors. With the following intermittent bursts of outliers, the trust values continue to decrease
and they eventually go below the threshold as shown in Fig. 4. Even though the trust values decrease also due to point
outliers, trust after a point outlier is re-established quickly thanks to the normal observations that follow. The trust
curves of the three neighbors are not identical as point outliers are generated by all nodes.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 4: (a)Data Points, (b)(c)(d) trust curves of three neighbors(trustors) of trustee(faulty node). All neighbors detect the intermittent fault.
Fig. 5: Performance for diﬀerent ratios of faulty sensor nodes
The detection accuracy (DA) and the false alarm rate (FAR) of the proposed method are tested using an event-driven
simulator of temperature sensor nodes deployed in a 60m×60m area on a square grid, each with a 6m transmission
range. DA is the ratio of number of detected faulty sensor nodes to the number of faulty sensor nodes, whereas
FAR is the ratio of number of non-faulty sensor nodes, that are detected as faulty, to the number of non-faulty nodes.
Sensor nodes evaluate the trust statements based on overhearing the packets without any communication overhead and
calculate trust values for all three trust statements and for all their neighbors. In diﬀerent tests, the network density
is scaled by 10, 20 and 30. The corresponding numbers of sensor nodes in a simulation varies from 100 to 300 for
diﬀerent density levels.
In simulation, intermittent faults are injected the network for evaluating the performance of trust statement P3. The
inter-arrival time of intermittent faults is given by the Poisson distribution. The duration of intermittent faults varies
uniformly from 10s to 20s. Point outliers are also injected to the network in order to test performance of the proposed
model in distinguishing between outliers and failures. An intermittent fault generates intermittent outlier bursts in
sensor readings with Poisson distribution with mean 0.1 sample/min. Initial trust value, Tthr, α and β are taken as 0.5,
0.2, 0.0005 and 0.001 respectively. α is considerably smaller than β, because the rate of trust increment should be
slower than the rate of trust decrease. The performance is shown in Fig. 5.
There are two cases for the selection of faulty sensor nodes in the network: uniform distribution and spatial cor-
relation. In uniformly distributed case, faulty sensor nodes are selected randomly and there is no spatial correlation
among them. On the contrary, faulty sensor nodes tend to be located close to each other in spatial correlation case.
In Fig. 5, the ratio of faulty sensor nodes are changed between 0.05 and 0.25. The proposed method concentrates
on trustworthiness of the data from the neighbors. Therefore, DA decreases gradually for all three density levels,
when the ratio of faulty sensor node increases. The probability of the fault in the neighbors increases with increasing
ratios. The lowest density network has the worst FAR performance compared with other density levels. Sensor nodes
can not detect faulty sensor nodes accurately with a density of 10 due to scarcity of neighbors, making it diﬃcult to
identify outliers. The modiﬁed Thompson Tau test makes an assumption that data is normally distributed. Therefore,
outliers are detected more accurately for higher densities (close to 7 neighbors for a density of 30), decreasing FAR.
In uniformly distributed faulty sensor nodes, the probability of multiple faulty sensor nodes in the same neighbor
set is low. Hence, the performance in case of uniform distribution is better than in case of spatial correlation. FAR
performance for spatial correlation is degraded especially for density 10 due to fewer neighbors. However, our pro-
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posed method could detect faults for spatial correlation with approximately 0.9 accuracy in lower faulty sensor node
rates. It could detect not only individual faulty sensor nodes but also faulty region that contains several faulty sensor
nodes. Neighbors of the faulty region could detect the faulty sensor nodes.
6. Conclusion
We have introduced a distributed fault detection method that has no communication overhead, requires very little
memory space and is applicable to large-scale smart spaces. Sensor nodes tend to send their measurements to the base
station for each pre-determined period. When a sensor node sends a packet, all of its neighbors receive the packet
due to overhearing. Therefore, our proposed model does not cause any communication overhead. Trust relationships
between sensor nodes are employed to detect intermittent and permanent faults. These trust statements are deﬁned
based on the fault speciﬁcation and they describe a fault-free state. The observation history is captured in two evidence
variables that are easy to work with in comparison to a time-window. A fault is detected when the trust value goes
below a predeﬁned threshold. The simulation results show that the proposed method can detect faults with high
accuracy regardless of the distribution of faulty sensors (uniform or non-uniform) in the network. As expected, the
detection accuracy decreases for higher ratios of faulty sensor nodes. The research on self-healing mechanisms in
order to prevent faults or postpone the eﬀects of faults in smart spaces is left as future work.
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